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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
SHERMAN V. LUND,
Plaintiff, Respondent, and
Cross-Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
9389

MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Sherman V. Lund, the respondent herein, commenced this
action against Mountain Fuel Supply Company, appellant, in
the District Court of Davis County, Utah, seeking damages
for losses sustained as a result of saturation by natural gas
of the soil at his residential property situate in the City of
Bountiful. From a jury verdict awarding damages to respondent
in the amount of $1,800.00, Mountain Fuel Supply Company
brings this appeal; and from the trial court's denial of respondent's motion for an additure, respondent cross-appeals.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the late spring and early summer of 1958, respondent's beautifully landscaped yard, which had theretofore
been regarded as the <(showplace" of the neighborhood (Tr.
87), inexplicably began to show signs of abnormal plant
behavior. Respondent's lawn turned yellow, his trees began
to wither and die and his flowers failed to grow (Tr. 50, 71,
72, 90) . At the suggestion of the County Agricultural agent,
appellant's employees were summoned by respondent to the
area and discovered a gas leak directly across the road from
respondent's property at the precise point where the feeder
pipeline supplying gas to respondent's premises was attached
to appellant's main gas line (Tr. 13, 14, 183). At the point
of the break, the main gas line was found to be only 16 inches
below the surface of the ground, and the surface of the
ground was found to be impressed with tire mark indentations
approximately 12 inches in depth (Tr. 25).
Upon initial examination of respondent's yard, appellant's
agents found portions of the same fully saturated with gas
(Tr. 51, 52, 53, 74, 195). Appellant's employees thereupon
warned respondent and his wife about smoking and lighting
lights (Tr. 52, 53, 54, 74), painted cautionary signs on and
about the respondent's home and dug pits along each side
of respondent's driveway to permit the gas in the ground to
escape (Tr. 53, 54, 75, 95). Respondent's ground smelled
of gas and en1itted visible gas fumes (Tr. 59, 85). Appellant's
employees admitted that gas was present in respondent's soil
and that natural gas has a deleterious effect on plant life (Tr.
195, 205, 219, 221, 222). The damage to respondent's property
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as a result of the gas continued to be evident in varying degrees
from the time of its initial discovery to the time of trial (Tr.
51, 60, 61, 62, 65, 73, 79, 80, 96, 97).
Appellant's main pipeline was installed in the area with
which we are here concerned in 1947 (Tr. 12), was owned
by appellant and under its exclusive management and control
(Tr. 33, 189, 190). Appellant purports to maintain a regular
inspection service of its lines (Tr. 39). The appellant's normal
procedure is to install its pipes at least three feet below the
ground ( T r. 33) ; however, after repairing the break discovered in the instant case, appellant left the pipes at the
same distance below the surface of the ground as they were
at the time of the discovery of the leak (Tr. 56, 57, 79, 192),
to wit: 16 inches (Tr. 25).
Respondent acquired his property approximately seven
years prior to the time of trial; and at the time of the acquisition, the home situate upon this property was several years
old (Tr. 42). During the time of respondent's residence in the
neighborhood, continuous residential construction had taken
place in the area (Tr. 56, 77).
The before and after value of respondent's premises were
estimated by respondent and an expert appraiser called at respondent's behest. Respondent estimated that the fair market
value of his pren1ises immediately prior to the damage complained of was $22,500.00 and he estimated the value of said
premises to be $16,000.00-$17,000.00 after the damage had
been fully inflicted (Tr. 63). Respondent's expert placed the
fair market value of the property in question at $21,500.00
immediately prior to the tnJury and $15,500.00 immediately
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after the gas pollution had reached its fullest extent (Tr. 106).
Appellant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company offered no evidence
whatsoever relative to damages.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY EVEN ASSUMING THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A STANDARD AS
TO THE PROPER DEPTH AT WHICH APPELLANT'S
PIPELINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTALLED OR PERMITTED TO REMAIN.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
ITS CHARGE TO THE JURY CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION NO.6.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR ADDITURE.

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY EVEN ASSUM-
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lNG THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A STANDARD AS
TO THE PROPER DEPTH AT WHICH APPELLANT'S
PIPELINES SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTALLED OR PERMITTED TO REMAIN.
Appellant contends that the evidence in the record of its negligence was insufficient to go to the jury because of the absence
of proof of a standard prescribing the depth at which appellant's pipeline should properly have been buried; that, consequently, the view taken of the premises by the jury could not
supply this standard; and because of the lack of such standard,
appellant's motions to dismiss were improperly denied.
At the outset, it is submitted that the propriety of this
argument is questionable in the light of the evidence of record.
Appellant's own employee, Mr. Makin, supplied the jury with
the standard appellant now contends was lacking. Called as
a hostile witness, he testified that it was ccnormal procedure"
for appellant to bury its line at a depth of 3 feet (Tr. 33).
The uncontroverted evidence shows that the appellant's pipes
at the point of break and leak were a mere 16 inches below
the surface of the ground (Tr. 25). Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to respondent, as this court is bound
to do on appeal, it is submitted that the jury could readily
have inferred that the appellant's pipes were originally installed and permitted to remain at that depth, to wit: 16
inches. This conclusion is strengthened by the complete
absence of any testimony on the matter proffered by appellant,
and is further strengthened by appellant's own testimonial
admission that the pipes were allowed to remain at that same
depth, viz., 16 inches, even after the discovery of the leak
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and the repair thereof (Tr. 192). Thus, from the testimony
of appellant's agents and employees, the jury could not only
infer the existence of the standard contended for, to wit: three
feet; but the jury could also infer a clear violation thereof,
to wit: 16 inches.
Although appellant suggests that the main at the point
of the break was originally imbedded in three feet of dirt and
that some unknown person whom appellant never produced
in court removed 20 inches of this cover while excavating a
driveway (Tr. 39), it should be noted by this court that such
evidence was simply the bare conclusions of appellant's employees, completely unsupported by any direct evidence.
Because of the obvious self-interests of appellant's employees,
testifying as they were in the presence of a superior official
of the appellant company (Tr. 217, 218), the jury was not
bound to accept their version of the facts, but on the contrary,
was entitled to draw its own conclusions from the evidence.
Arnold Machinery Company v. Intrusion Prepakt Inc., 357
P .2d 496 (Utah 1960).
But let us assume, arguendo only, the correctness of
appellant's position that proof of a standard as to depth is
lacking in the evidence. To substantiate this position, appellant
attempts to analogize the determination of a proper depth
below the surface at which to lay conduit pipe to the professional skill and care required of a physician in administering
to a patient. Stated another way, appellant argues that the
amount of dirt required to adequately cover a metal pipe and
thereby protect it from damage by external pressure from
above is a matter so technical and dependent upon such com-
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plex scientific skill and knowledge that a layman must be
presumed to know nothing about such things. Cf. Huggins v.
Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523, 524. The bare statement
of this proposition reveals its inherent fallacy; even a small
child burying toys in a sand pile has some appreciation as
to how deep he must burrow!
Harper & James, Vol. 2, The Law of Torts, 1956, Sec.
17.1, states the general rule as follows:
ttAs a general proposition it is not essential to a
party's case that he prove or otherwise show what his
opponent should have done under the circumstances.
It is enough to show what he did and what the circumstances were. It is then for the jury to determine
whether, in the light of their common experience in
the affairs of men, they find he failed to act as a reasonable man would have acted. This implies that
there was some concrete thing that he could have done
or omitted to do, and that such act or such omitted precaution was reasonable and feasible, and would have
· been effective to prevent injury under the circumstances.
But if it is within the competence of men of affairs
generally to make this judgment in a given case, the
jury may make it even though there is no proof . . .
in the case which points directly to any specific precaution that could reasonably have been taken and
even though the jury themselves are not satisfied as
to the precise nature of what ought to have been done.
In this sense the jury need not fix or agree upon a
standard of conduct of precaution to be taken, but
need only find that the conduct of the party falls
short of any standard which they would agree upon
as reasonable. The jury's finding of negligence is thus
always that the actor should not have acted as he did;
this implies a finding that he should have acted other-
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wise, but not necessarily in any specific manner."
(Emphasis is the author's.)

*

*

*

cccourts could very easily expand the area in which
expert testimony is required to establish the standard
of conduct, but the tendency has been instead to resolve
doubtful questions in favor of allowing the jury to
decide the issue of negligence without its aid." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it has been held that the question of whether a
ship deck without guard or rail was a reasonably safe place
to work, without proof of what good seamanship demanded
under the circumstances, was properly for the jury. Zinnel
v. U. S. Shipping Bd. E. F. Corp., 10 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925,
per L. Hand) . The question of required clearance between
a train and a mail crane, without testimony on the matter,
was held properly for the jury in the case of Missouri K. &T.
Ry. Co. v. Williams, 103 Tex. 228, 125 S.W. 881. The feasibility of carrying electric wires on cross arms that protrude
from one side of a pole only was held properly for the jury
unaided by expert testimony in the case of Harris v. Central
P. Co., 109 Neb. 500, 191 N.W. 711 (1922). The proper
safeguards for the construction and operation of an escalator
in a department store was likewise held to be a matter for
the jury despite the absence of proof of a standard to guide
it in the case of Reynolds v. May Dept. Stores Co., 127 F.2d
396 (8th Cir. 1942). See also Graves v. May Dept. Stores Co.,
153 S.W. 2d 778 (Mo. App. 1941).
It is submitted, therefore, that the question of whether
16 inches or even three feet was a proper depth at which to
bury an unencased metal pipe line, or a proper depth at which
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to permit such a line to remain, in an area bustling with
residential construction and where one could reasonably anticipate heavy vehicular surface traffic was in any view of the
evidence a question properly within the unaided competence
of the jury to decide and the court below committed no error
in permitting them to do so.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN
ITS CHARGE TO THE JURY CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION NO.6.
Appellant next assigns error to the court below in its
charge to the jury contained in Instruction No. 6. Appellant
attacks this instruction on three separate theories, to wit: ( 1)
The instruction assumes that the seepage of gas in the plaintiff's yard was the cause of plaintiff's damage, although there
was no proof of that ultimate fact in the record; ( 2) The
instruction took from the jury the question of appellant's
negligence; and ( 3) The instruction put to the jury the question
of negligent installation when there was no proof that appellant installed the pi pes and the instruction further allowed
the jury to determine whether appellant was negligent in permitting the pipes to remain too near the surface, although
there was no proof of a standard to guide the jury in deciding
what was a proper depth.
With respect to appellant's first theory enumerated above,
it is respectfully submitted that Instruction No. 6 does not
take from the jury the question of causation. Interrogatories
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1-A and 2-C (R. 58, 60) of said Instruction, which is quoted
in toto in appellant's brief, clearly require the jury to find that
respondent's damage was nproximately caused by the seepage
of gas in question." Moreover, appellant is not entitled to
have this instruction construed in vacuo. Instruction Nos. 7
and 8 (R. 61, 62) given to the jury by the trial court properly
presented to the jury the issue of proximate cause and said
Instruction No. 8 defined the same fully and fairly. This
court has held time and again that instructions are to be viewed
as a whole. Hadley v. Wood, 345 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah 1959).
As to the contention that the record is devoid of proof of causation, the court is referred to the statement of facts contained
in thi~ brief, which reveals in essence that respondent's yard
noted for its lush and beautiful appearance (Tr. 87) suddenly
and inexplicably ('Tr. 71) became "barren-like" (Tr. 90),
the flowers and trees withered and died and the lawn became
straw-like (Tr. 89, 90). Simultaneously with this change of
condition in respondent's yard, a gas leak was discovered
directly across the road from the yard and the yard was found
to be saturated with gas (Tr. 14, 51, 52, 53, 74, 183, 195).
Moreover, appellant stipulates at Page 10 of its brief that
gas seeped into respondent's yard. It is submitted that from
these facts alone the jury would be entitled to infer causation.
However, appellant's own witness, Mr. Robinson, the Superintendent of Distribution for appellant (Tr. 218), supplied
by his testimony any alleged deficiency in the evidence as to
the poisonous character of natural gas. Note the following
examination by Court and counsel of this witness (Tr. 222):
nTHE COURT: Do you know the mechanics of death
to the plant when they are affected by gas?
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A. Yes.
THE COURT: Will you tell the jury what the mechanics of death is.
A. The gas goes into the soil and dries out the soil and
takes away the moisture and they dry up and wilt.
THE COURT: Your witness.
MR. OMAN: Does natural gas not enter moisture
itself and be carried in suspension in water?
A. Water enters the gas and goes along with the gas,
the gas will absorb the moisture out of the soil.

Q. So in the breathing process of the plant, part of that
takes place in the roots, does it not?
A. It could do.
MR. OMAN: And the gas is entering the plant through
that process through the synthesis of the plant and
causes the plant to lose its ability to breathe.
A. That is true.
MR. OMAN: That is all.
MR. CRAWFORD: That is all.
THE COURT: I am curious then, why would a plant
die left in the soil after the gas is removed?
A. Well, because the gas is not out of the soil. * *

*"

With respect to appellant's second theory of attack
enumerated above, suffice it to say that Instruction Nos. 7,
9, 10 and 19 (R. 61, 63, 64, 73), given by the trial court to
the jury, fully and fairly, and without exception taken thereto,
presented the issue of negligence to the jury as did Interrogatory
2- B (R. 60) embodied within the very instruction complained
of. Moreover, Instruction 15 ( R. 69) clear!y admonished the
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jury that allegations of and instructions upon the question of
damages are to be considered only after a finding of liability.
Hadley v. Wood, supra.
As to appellant's third contention enumerated above that
there was no proof of installation of the pipes by appellant,
it must be noted in considering this contention that the record
clearly reflects that the line was installed in 1947 (Tr. 12),
that although appellant sometimes may not install its own
pipe, but may let a contract for its installation, installation in
such cases is effected under the complete direction and supervision of the appellant, and the details of such installation are
completely prescribed by appellant, even as to ccwhere" the
line shall be put (Tr. 189, 190); moreover, the lines, including
the feeder lines, are owned, maintained, inspected and controlled absolutely and exclusively by the appellant (Tr. 33,
190). It is submitted that the jury was entitled to infer from
this evidence that any determination as to the depth or manner
of installation was the determination of appellant and none
other. It should further be noted in this connection that the fact
of installation is a matter peculiarly within the sole knowledge
of the appellant, yet it came forward with no evidence whatsoever to rebut the above inference.
Appellant's argument that the court erred in allowing the
jury absent testimony of a standard to determine appellant's
negligence in permitting the pipe to remain too near the surface
has been treated earlier in this brief.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR ADDITURE.

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The measure of damages applied by the trial court in
its charge to the jury is contained in the first paragraph of
Instruction No. 6 (R. 58). The measure applied was the
diminution in the value of the property in question resulting
from the gas pollution complained of.
The only testimony presented to the jury was that of
respondent himself, who estimated the value of his property
diminished at least $5,500.00 and that of respondent's duly
qualified expert, Marcellus K. Palmer, who estimated that
respondent's property diminished in value $6,000.00 as a result
of appellant's gas pollution of respondent's premises (Tr. 63,
106). Appellant offered no evidence whatsoever to contradict
this testimony.
The general rule was recent! y and succinct! y stated by this
court in the case of Page v. Federal Security Insurance Co.,
332 P. 2d 666 (Utah, 1958) as follows:
((The traditional and well established rule is: the
fact trier, in this instance the jury, has the prerogative
of judging credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be given the evidence. This admittedly would not go
so far as to permit it to arbitrarily disregard credible
uncontradicted evidence. But wherever there is a basis
from which bias, prejudice or self interest may be seen,
or there is anything incredible in the testimony, the
jury is not obliged to accept it." (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly no basis is shown in the evidence here that Mr.
Palmer was in any way biased or prejudiced for respondent
or against appellant, nor can it be said that a diminution in
the fair market value of respondent's land in the amount of
$6,000.00 is incredible when viewed against the abundant
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evidence of plant damage and soil pollution, coupled with
the constant danger of explosion requiring extreme care upon
the part of the occupants of the premises involved (Tr. 52,
54, 74, not to mention the consternation caused by this
situation ( T r. 80, 100) , which, it is submitted, would be a
substantial factor in and of itself in diminishing property
values.
It is submitted, therefore, that the jury by fixing damages in
the amount of only $1,800.00 arbitrarily disregarded the only
credible, uncontradicted evidence in the record and the trial
court, therefore, erred in failing to grant respondent's motion
for additure (R. 81, 82; Tr. 247). This court may cure such
error on appeal. Badon v. SuhrmannJ 327 P.2d 826 (Utah
1958).

CONCLUSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the jury below
was entitled to determine the fact of appellant's negligence
unaided by proof of any standard assuming, arguendo, that
such proof was lacking; that the charge of the court contained
in its Instruction No. 6 was in all respects proper; and that,
therefore, the verdict returned by the jury and the judgment
entered thereon should be affirmed and increased by additure
by this court in the additional amount of $3,700.00.
Respectfully submitted,
OlviAN & SAPERSTEIN

Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
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